An increasing number of longitudinal data sets collect expectations information regarding a variety of future individual level events and decisions, providing researchers with the opportunity to explore expectations over micro variables in detail. We provide a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology to use that type of information to test the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis in models of individual behavior. This RE assumption at the micro level underlies a majority of the research in applied fields in economics, and it is the common foundation of most work in dynamic models of individual behavior. We present tests using two different panel data sets that represent two very different populations. In both cases we cannot reject the RE hypothesis. Our results support a wide variety of models in economics, and other disciplines, that assume rational behavior.
Introduction
An increasing number of large longitudinal data sets now collect expectations information regarding future individual level events and decisions, providing researchers with the opportunity to explore expectations over micro variables in detail. The growing body of research studying expectations includes the literatures that analyze wage and income expectations (Dominitz and Manski 1996 , and Das and van Soest 1997 , fertility expectations and pregnancy outcomes (Van Hoorn and Keilman 1997 , Van Peer 2000 , and Walker 2003 , the connection between Social Security expectations and retirement savings (Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz 2001, Lusardi 1999) , the relationship between retirement expectations and retirement outcomes (Bernheim 1989 , Dwyer and Hu 1999 , Disney and Tanner 1999 , Coronado and Perozek 2001 , Hurd and Retti 2001 , Forni 2002 , Dwyer 2002 , and Mastrogiacomo 2003 , and consumption patterns after retirement (Haider and Stephens 2003, and Hurd and Rohwedder 2003) .
In this paper we present a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology to use expectation information to test the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis in models of individual behavior. We then use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience (NLSY79) to analyze retirement and education expectations, respectively. We find that these two types of expectations are consistent with the RE hypothesis. Our results support the use of a wide variety of models in economics that assume rational behavior.
Our definition and approach to testing the RE hypothesis will be consistent with the views expressed by the precursors of this assumption. We will maintain that agents' subjective beliefs about the evolution of a set of variables of interest coincide with the objectively measurable population probability measure. This is consistent with the characterization of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972) . 1 The main difference is that instead of concentrating on forecasts of market level variables we focus on how individuals form expectations over micro variables that are in part under their control. Economists and social scientists in general, are growing increasingly interested in this type of measures as possible sources of additional variation in individual characteristics that might reflect underlying differences in preference and beliefs parameters.
It is important to distinguish that while in macroeconomic theory the RE hypothesis is understood mainly as an equilibrium concept, thanks largely to Lucas' seminal contributions, where expectations affect the stochastic evolution of the economy and this evolution in turn affects expectations formation, in microeconomic applications the concept is used as a synonym of individual rationality or an efficient use of information with regard to individual level variables. The latter implies that somehow the economy is in equilibrium. This RE assumption at the micro level underlies a majority of the research in applied fields in economics, and it is at the forefront of most work in dynamic models of individual behavior. This is primarily because most household and individual level data sources are rich in micro variables and it is the responsibility of the researcher to try to control for the macroeconomic environment in which those decisions are made.
The debate over whether testing rational expectations is a worthwhile enterprise goes back almost three decades. Prescott (1977) expressed a strong opinion against testing the hypothesis, while Simon (1979) , Tobin (1980) , Revankar (1980) , Zarnowitz (1984), and Lovell (1986) considered the direct analysis of expectations an important project, and more recently, Manski (2003) has emphasized the importance of analyzing expectations formation, but in Manski (1990) he advocated the careful use of any kind of intentions data, especially if to be used to predict behavior.
The efforts to test the hypothesis began in the context of the analysis of price expectations by Turnovsky (1970) , the term structure of interest rates with the work of Sargent (1972 ), Shiller (1973 , and Modigliani and Shiller (1973) , and then with the life cycle permanent income hypothesis in a stream of literature that started with the work of Hall (1978) , and then compared forecasts of market variables with realizations like in Figlewski and Watchtel (1981 , 1983 ), Kimball Dietrich and Joines (1983 ), de Leeuw and McKelvey (1981 and 1984 , Gramlich (1983) , Kinal and Lahiri (1988) , and Keane and Runkle (1990) , and more recently, Lee (1996) , Davies and Lahiri (1999), and Christiansen (2003) . 2 Finally, work by Leonard (1982) analyzed wage expectations of employers, and Fair (1993) analyzed the question in the context of large macroeconomic models. In all these cases the concern was with market level variables, and the evidence in these and many other studies is mixed. Below, we propose a slightly different approach in line with Bernheim (1990) and Benítez-Silva and Dwyer (2003) , and use panel data available through the HRS and the NLSY79 to follow two very different cohorts of individuals planning an important decision for people their age, retirement and education.
It is important to clarify that if our tests reject the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis, two very different, but nonetheless connected, interpretations are possible. First, we could conclude that models of rational behavior expect too much of individuals, forcing us to abandon the "full rationality hypothesis" that agents behave "as if" they were making a large number of computations implied by the theory. One possible alternative to the fully rational model could be an adaptive learning model which introduces a form of bounded rationality, in which individuals use standard econometric and statistical techniques to make and adjust their forecasts of relevant variables, with RE emerging as an equilibrium of this trial and error process (see, for example, Pesaran 1987, and Evans and Honkapohja 2001 for presentations of these type of models). Second, we could conclude that reality is much more complex than even most dynamic models assume, with individuals forming expectations (maybe rational ones) not over a fixed probability distribution of uncertain events, but over a family of distributions for each source of uncertainty. This involves individuals learning over time about the characteristics of these distributions and updating their priors as new information comes along.
The first conclusion would be a set back for a large body of research in economics, since it would put into question an attractive and central tool. The second, would mean that we need more realistic economic models, which are likely to be more complex, but also more attentive to details of the process of expectations formation by individuals.
Finally, if our tests do not reject the rational expectations hypothesis, we can at least continue to rely on that rationality, and the strategies used to model it, as a good first approximation to behavior by individual decision makers. Furthermore, it would then be reasonable to use some of these variables in modeling complex economic situations, an objective that Haavelmo (1958) already emphasized, as quoted in Savage (1971) .
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The conceptual model and the econometric specifications are presented in section 2. Section 3 provides information about the data sets used in the empirical work, and section 4 reports our main findings. Section 5 concludes. 
A Model and a Test of Rational Expectations using Micro Data
Suppose an individual and a researcher are trying to predict a variable X that the individual has decided will be determined as a function of a sequence of random variables:
The sequence of vector-valued variables inside the parenthesis will be observed by the individual at time periods t=1,2,…,T. Then the individual will take action X after some or all the ω t 's have been observed. Then we can define
where E is the expectations operator. This is the most commonly used representation of the RE hypothesis, which takes as the rational expectation of a variable its conditional mathematical expectation (Sargent and Wallace 1976) . 4 This guarantees that errors in expectations will be uncorrelated with the set of variables known at time t.
Variables included in the vector representing the information set Ω come from models of individual behavior, and might include socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Using the law of iterated expectations and assuming that the new information is correctly forecasted by agents (its conditional distribution not just its mean), from (2) we get:
where ω t+1 represents information that comes available between periods t and t+1. Then from (3) we can write the evolution of expectations through time as 
where α is a constant, and γ is a vector of parameters that estimate the effect of information in period t on period's t+1 expectations. The RE hypothesis implies that α=γ=0, and β=1. A weak RE test, in the terminology of Lovell (1986) and Bernheim (1990) , assumes that γ is equal to a vector of zeros, and tests for α=0 and β=1--effectively testing whether expectations follow a random walk.
The strong RE test is less restrictive and also tests for γ=0.
Econometric Specifications
Estimating (5) is in principle straightforward, but the likely presence of measurement error in the dependent variable and its lag and sample selection, complicate the methodology.
As with all survey data, measurement error in proxy variables is a concern. We are particularly concerned with noisy self-reports of the expectation variables. We are concerned about reporting errors that may be correlated with measurement errors in other factors or omitted variables. We will be assuming that the measurement error that individuals incur is in no way correlated with the rationality of their expectations formation process but has more to do, for example, with the differences across individuals in the environment faced in each wave of the panel. For example, the month and year of the survey can have an effect on the amount of noise in the expectation variable;
because it affects the degree of rounding in the measure of age and the variable of interest. 5 Then the interview environment would affect the report over time in a way that is not observed. This component of the self-reports can bias the coefficient of interest in unpredictable ways. In order to eliminate this noise, we want to capture the true component of the expectation and purge it of this source of bias. If measurement error was not a problem we would expect the β coefficient of the IV estimator to be very close to the one from the OLS specification, assuming validity of the instruments set. However, we will see below that the coefficient significantly changes and approximates the value predicted by the theory. Notice, that nothing constrains the β coefficient of the IV specification to move towards 1, and the fact that it does, can be interpreted as support of our estimation strategy to uncover the structural parameters of the models of rational expectations formation.
Since people are reporting expectations over uncertain events, we expect some degree of reporting error that may be correlated with unobserved factors. In fact, Bernheim (1988) finds that retirement expectations are reported with noise, and this is also likely to be true of expected educational attainment, since even completed education is reported with error (Black, Sanders, and Taylor 2003) . We correct for this problem using instrumental variables analysis. The instruments must be correlated with the expectation as of time t but not with the error term or any new information relevant to the t+1 expectation. We use time t subjective survival to age 85
probabilities and an indicator of smoking behavior as instruments (exclusion restrictions correlated with the rate of time preference) of retirement expectations, and the educational attainment of the parents as instruments (exclusion restrictions) for expected years of education.
In the case of the selection problem we will be making the implicit assumption (and this is true in any econometric application that tries to solve the selection bias problem à la Heckman 1979, and wants to make a statement about the general population under analysis) that those that do not respond the question of interest would use the same process to analyze information if they were to actually answer the question as those that answer the question. Meaning that those that we do not observe answering the expectations questions are not following a completely different model (maybe irrational) to decide their retirement ages, but instead that for a number of observable and unobservable reasons they did not report our dependent variable.
Here we follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 567) to consistently estimate the effect of previous expectation on current expectation, and from (5) we write
where we first estimate the selection equation (8) using a probit specification, where Y i is equal to one if both the expectation in period t and the expectation in period t+1 are observed, which means that the individual answers a question about her future retirement or future educational attainment.
This procedure allows for arbitrary correlation between the disturbances in the three equations.
Z 3 in equation (8) Notice that in the HRS we assume that age is a proxy for the information set, and only matters in terms of making you more or less likely to think about retirement, but does not directly affect the expected retirement age. The reason for this is twofold: First, as Vella (1998, p. 135 ) discusses, including a variable like age, which in our sample has a fairly small range, can lead to the apparent linearity of the inverse Mills' ratio, which can result in weak identification of the selection model, inflated second step standard errors, and what it is even more troubling, unreliable estimates of the coefficients of interest. Second, on economic grounds we believe it is reasonable to assume that age matters for whether you have thought about retirement and the timing of that retirement, but, consistent with the assumption we are testing, should not be included when estimating the structural equation. In section 4 we discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
In the selection equation we have decided to only include covariates as of time t, we have experimented with including t+1 variables, and also a battery of residuals of the regressions of t+1
variables on their lagged values, which are then also included in the main equation. Although some coefficients in the main equation changed as a result of these modifications, the results we report in the paper are robust to this characterization of the selection process.
We then consistently estimate (6) by performing a modified 2SLS procedure, where the first stage includes as regressors the exogenous variables used in (8), which might or might not include the exclusion restrictions of the selection equation with respect to the structural equation, the Inverse Mills' ratio from the probit equation, and any additional instruments (exclusion restrictions), Z 2 in (7), the validity of which will be tested.
This procedure has been rarely used in empirical work, which is rather surprising given the pervasiveness of the two problems tackled here, measurement error (or endogeneity) and selection.
In the results section we will discuss in some detail identification issues, and we will also discuss the sensitivity analysis we have undertaken to check the robustness of our results to different characterizations of the instruments and exclusion restrictions in the estimation procedure.
The HRS and the NLSY79
To test the RE hypothesis on the retirement expectations of older Americans we use the first five waves of the HRS, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 households headed by an individual aged 51 to 61 as of the first interviews in 1992-93. The fifth round of interviews was in the field during 2000. We include respondents that are working, full time or part time, in any wave, and non-employed (but searching for jobs) that report retirement plans. In each wave respondents are asked when they plan to fully or partially depart from the labor force and whether they have thought about retirement. Most of the people who have not thought about retirement do not report an expected age. Many of them report that they will never retire. If they have not given it any thought, and they say they will never retire, we treat their expected retirement age as missing.
If they give a retirement age we treat them as non-missing. We have assigned an age of 77 for those who never retire, as a proxy for estimated longevity. Table 3 presents the weak and strong RE tests for the sample from the HRS, and Table 4 presents the tests for the NLSY79 sample. The HRS data support the weak and strong RE hypotheses in the augmented model that corrects for sample selection and measurement error in the report of expected retirement age, and the NLSY79 supports the RE hypotheses in expected educational attainment both in the IV and the corrected IV specifications. For the HRS all these estimators control for clustering (Deaton 1997) , given that we often have more than one observation per person over time.
Empirical Results
First, we perform an F-test based on the null hypothesis that β=1 in equation (4), to test the weak RE hypothesis. We obtain coefficients for β of 1.05 for the weaker test using the retirement expectations data, and 0.981 using the education expectations data, which cannot reject the hypothesis that both expectations follow a random walk, even though both coefficients are fairly precisely estimated. For the pooled OLS estimation this test is effectively a unit root test, and as such, following the literature on testing unit roots in panel data surveyed by Bond, Nauges, and
Windmeijer (2002), we perform a correction to obtain the appropriate critical value. However, this matters very little since the unit root hypothesis is soundly rejected.
For the strong RE test we estimate the model of equations (6) to (8) using the corrected IV procedure. Also we estimate equation (6) by pooled OLS, equations (6) and (8) by the traditional selection correction à la Heckman (1979) , and equations (6) and (7) by IV. In the corrected IV procedure the β parameter is estimated to be equal to 0.94 in the HRS and 0.991 in the NLSY79, in both cases very precisely estimated, and clearly failing to reject the RE hypothesis. Notice the importance in the HRS of both instrumenting the previous period's expectations, and controlling for sample selection. Interestingly, in the HRS, this corrected IV technique seems to circumvent one of the traditional drawbacks of instrumental variables estimation, that is, the large increase in standard errors in the IV estimates. Notice that the standard errors of the β parameter are less than half that of the uncorrected IV estimator, although still larger than in the OLS estimation.
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It is natural at this time to ask ourselves the reason behind the difference in point estimates we obtain for our main parameter of interest, which allows us to test the RE hypothesis, when we go from the traditional IV estimator to the corrected IV estimator. In the NLSY79 the case is less controversial since traditional IV estimation, without correcting for sample selection, already delivers the main result, that is, that we cannot reject the RE hypothesis. For this sample it comes down to whether we trust the exclusion restrictions we have made regarding the fact that the education of the mother and the father affect educational attainment at time t but are not correlated with the disturbances in equation (6). The best we can do to convince the reader of the validity of the instruments is to perform the tests suggested in the literature, so we follow the suggestions in Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), Staiger and Stock (1997) , Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) , and Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2002) , and find that we have robust instruments, with very large F statistics in the first stage of the IV procedure, several times larger than the minimum value (around 10) suggested in Staiger and Stock (1997) , and also discussed in Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) , as a good rule of thumb to check whether we are in the presence of weak instruments (see Tables   A .5. and A.6 . in the Appendix). Also, the model is overidentified, which allow us to test whether our instruments are exogenous with respect to the error term in the structural equation. A rejection of this test would suggest that the instruments are either not truly exogenous or they should be 6 Notice that in columns three and four of Tables 3 and 4 , we do not report the adjusted R 2 measure of fit. This is common practice, but it is rarely mentioned in empirical work. These types of measures do not have independent significance in structural estimation à la IV, given that we are after estimating population parameters, which we consider invariant to the particular way of identifying the parameters (instruments), not after minimizing a particular prediction problem. See Ruud (2000, p. 515-516 for a discussion) included in the main regression of interest. In all cases we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions.
In the HRS the corrected IV estimator is clearly higher than the traditional IV estimator and almost twice as large as the estimates from OLS and selection corrected procedures. The mechanism behind this result is in part due to the inclusion of age, along with other variables as explained in section 2, as an exclusion restriction of the selection equation. If age is not included as a regressor of the selection equation (8), then the corrected IV procedure delivers an estimate of β essentially identical to that of the traditional IV procedure, which depending on the specification almost always rejects the RE hypothesis. Again, we believe that the inclusion of age in the selection equation is uncontroversial. Whether we should also include it when jointly estimating equations (6) and (7) is less clear. Wooldridge (2002) suggests that unless there is a clear reason for not including all the exogenous variables of the selection equation as additional instruments when estimating the corrected IV model, these should be included. In Section 2 we have provided two justifications for why we do not include age when estimating equations (6) and (7). However, as a sensitivity analysis we have included it. When we do, the point estimate of the β parameter goes up to 1.08, with a standard error a bit lower than the one reported in Table 3 , but even in this case we are not able to reject that the coefficient is equal to 1 at the 5% significance level. In the HRS, as with the NLSY79, when testing the exclusion restrictions of the IV procedures we could soundly reject the hypothesis that we had weak instruments (see Tables A .2. and A.3 . in the Appendix), and the validity of the overidentifying restrictions could not be rejected at any traditional level of significance. 7 7 We have also estimated just identified models using either the probability of living to 85 or the smoking indicator as exclusion restrictions. In both cases we could not reject the RE hypothesis, given that although the point estimates of the β parameter changed to 0.88 and 1.05 respectively, the standard errors increased by around 50%. In both cases we were able to reject the hypothesis that we had a weak instrument.
It is important to mention that the importance of the selection correction when using the HRS contrasts with the results by Bernheim (1990) where selection was not important, and the inability to reject rationality was in part the product of large standard errors. In the NSLY79 although we cannot reject the presence of sample selection in the weak test, the RE results do not depend on this additional correction. Finally, the reported results are the product of robustly estimating the system of equations via GMM, which provides robustness against unknown forms of heterokedasticity. In the implementation of this procedure we have followed the practical suggestions in Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2002) .
Notice that the RE hypothesis also predicts that in the strong test the information available at time t should not be significant after controlling for time t expectations when estimating (6). In both data sets after controlling for sample selection and measurement error we find that most of these factors are no longer significant. The joint hypotheses that all the coefficients are equal to zero cannot be rejected at any traditional level of significance, and the same is true of the estimates of the constant, validating the other predictions of the RE hypothesis regarding retirement and education expectations. 
Conclusions
We have tested the Rational Expectations hypothesis in the formation of expectations for retirement and educational attainment, using representative samples of older and younger reporting errors and sample selection. These results support the use of the expectations variables in the growing number of data sets that provide this type of information, and support the use of models that use this assumption.
The methodology we present can be easily applied in many other contexts where repeated observations of expectations variables at the micro level are collected. The results of this analysis are meant to foster further discussion and research on the issues surrounding the role of expectations in economics and the social sciences, and in particular the importance and validity of the Rational Expectations hypothesis. Reject P-v=.000 4,634 
